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The Motor Theory of SPeech
Perception'
CHRISTOPHER MOLE
There is a long-standing project in psychology the goal ofwhich is ro explain
our abiliry to perceive speech. The project is motivated by evidence lhat seems
to indicale lhal the cognitive processing to which speech sounds are subjected
is somehow different from rhe nor-rnal processing employed in hearing The
Motor Theory ofspeech perception was proposed in the r9óos as an atlempl to
e>i:plain this specialness. It is currently enjoying a renewal ofinlerest' pârtly on
aciount of our developing understanding of mirror-neurons (lhe existence of
rvhich is suggestive but not conclusive) and partly on account of some ¡ecent
work using Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (Fadiga et al zooz) '
This esáy has two pats. The fìrst is concerned with the Motor Theory's
""pl"nandom 
and shows that it is Élher hard to give a precise account of
what the Motor Theory is a theory of The second part of the essay identifìes
problems with the explanans: The¡e are difüculties in finding a Plausible
account of what the conlent of the Moto¡ Theory is supposed to be The
agenda of both parts is rather negative, and problerns will be uncovered râther
tñan solved. In the concluding section, I shall suggest where one might look
if one wanls to solve the Motor Theory's problen1s, but it is unclear whether
the Motor Theory's problems orglrf to be solved, or whether the whole theory
should be abandoned.
I.
Psychologists were first persuaded that speech perception is unlike the
pe..eptiJn ofoth"r sounds by the failure of atlemPts to build reading machines
.Thisrvo¡krv¡sdonewhietheau¡horheldthe WilianlAlexanderFleetFeowship,Thanksâre
due to Msjuliå Fìeet. who sadlv died lvhiie this volume was ni prePârâlion'
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for the blind. Nowadays our computeß do a goodjob ofrendering a written
texl into speech, but ir was not always so easy. _A.fter rhe Second World War
there were lots of recently blinded people, for whom a machine rhat could
read aloud would have been a very good thing. There was also ra¡her little
computing power available. The task of building a n.rachine that would tu¡n
texL ilrto speech seemed to be a practically impossible one, but the tâsk of
building a machine that would make soze sort ofdistinc¡ ro¡se for each of rhe
lerte¡s in a text seemed straightfoÌward enough. The more ambitious task of
building a machine that would make a disdnct noise for each of the separare
speech sounds in the text (that is, each of the phoøemes) also looked like a real
possibiliry.
Such a rask may have been computationally tractable, but as a substitute for
reading ir was complerely hopeless. The thing thât made the project hopeless
was that the listener's ears just couldn't keep up. If one,s reading machine
was making its sounds a! a pace that was anything like the pace at which ou¡
mouths make souncfs when we speak, then it was making sounds at a rate that
was fa¡ too fast fo¡ the listener to ¡esolve. If rhe sounds were given slowly
enough for the listener to resolve rhem, then they came far too slowly to
effectively comr¡unicate a text. Whichever sounds are allocated to individual
letters or phonemes, the resuking auditory presentation of wo¡ds takes much
longer to comprehend and puts a much greater load on working memory than
w¡itten text or speech. Training cloes litrle ro help. ,{s Alvin Liberman, one of
the first and most prominent resea¡che¡s on speech, puts it, ,Only the sounds
of speech are eficient vehicles fo¡ phonetic structures; no other sounds, no
matcer how a¡tfully contrived, will work beter than about one tenth as well,
(Liberrnan r99o).
The blind war vetemns stood no chânce at all oflearning to recognize the
rapidly presented sounds ofthe 'reading machines,, bur they had, like ¡he resr
ofus, learned in infancy how to recognize the phonemes that make up speech,
and these phonemes can be resolved at a very fast rare indeed. Why, then,
could they not lea¡n to resolve any other sounds ar anything approaching
the same pace? It seems that somehow speech must be speciaì. perhaps its
specialness has something to do with its being learned so earþ on. perhaps it is
special because it is massively mo¡e familiar thân other sounds, and massively
more pracliced, but perhaps it is special in orher ways, too. Language so
of¡en is.2
'.Not eve¡yoræ in rhe psychoÌogy of speech percepdoD hâs sigDed on to thc ,speech is spe_
cial' vierv, but dissenr ß ce¡!âinly mre. The dissendne view can be found in rhe discussion of
Milleis Auditory-Perceptual Pointer Model in IC¡tr (1989). Or Fowterì ,Di¡ecr Re¡lisr, lheory(FowÌer re8ó).
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The syllables /pa/ and /ba/ borh begrn with bitabial plosive consonants.
That is to say that the inirial sound in borh is produced by closing the 1ips,
allowing a little air ro build up behind them, and then releasing rhar air. They
differ in the moment during this performance at which the vocal chords begin
to vibrate. For a /ba/ the vocal chords vibrate almost as soon as the air is
released. Ä,/pal is produced when the vocal chords vib¡ate a little later. The
time between the release of the ai¡ held ¿r ¡he lips and the beginning of the
vocal chord vib¡ation is called voice-onset cime (VOT). VOT can be varied
continuously ând a spectrum ofphonemes can be artificially produced, each of
which differs from the preceding phoneme only by, say, an inc¡ease in VOT
of ro ms.
If we listen to each of rhe sounds in this continuously varying specrrum
they are not heard as varyíng conrinuously. We don,t hear a sequence oflbals
gently sloping offinto penumbral cases which gradually become recognizable
as /pals. Instead, the first half of ¡he spect¡um is all heard as more or less the
sante /ba/ sound, and the second half of the spectrum is ¿ll heard as more
o¡ less the same /pa/ sound, and there is a nar¡ow band in the nriddle of
the spectrum, when VOT is around zó.8 ms, where subjects differ âs to how
they hear the sound. A¡ this transition point subjects can recognize very slight
variations in VOT, since these slight variations are enough to move the sound
from one category to the next. From the point of view of the subject, rhe
clifference betv/een a syllable wirh VOT of z6_8 ms and a syllable with VOT
of36.8 ms sounds like a realty big difference, whereas a diffe¡ence ofthe same
objective magnitude, between, say, VOT of 3o ms and of 4o ms, sounds like
a very slight difi'erence. In the first pair, one of the syllables sounds lìke a /l>a/
and ¡he orhe¡ sounds like a /pa/.ln the second pair, rhe two syllables are
more or less indistinguishable ,/ba,/s.3 This distincrive discrimination function
is found for many of the dimensions of variacion chat, like VOT, make the
difference between two consonants, although it isn,c found fo¡ vowels.
This finding by itself is rarher unrenârkable. It isn,r surprising to find a
dilÌ-erence berween rhe discrimination funcrions for complex sorts ofvariation,
such as variation in VOT, and the discrimination funcrions for simple sorts
of variation, such as variation in pitch. And it isn'r surprising that we exploir
3 This is ã. slighr sirnplifìcahon of the experinental procedure used, trut no r, I thDt, a significãnt
one. The usuâl procedu¡e is not pai¡-wlse companson but comparisoD of ripÌes. Subjects are presenre<l
wrth a pàir ofneìshboriDg sounds-,4 ãnd B-¿nd then presented a thirdìoùnd X_whiclì ¡jusr
Èhe sème as either.4 or B. Their task is to discem whrclì ofthe rwo initiat sounds X repe¡ts. Wirh a
VOT continuun wlìere neighbouring ìtcnx diû-er by ro ms, subjects perform close to Àance on the
.lBX task fòr âlncr âll ofthe specrrum excepr fo¡ rhe poinr (when VOT is aroLrnd 2ó.8 nrs) âÈ which
A is heard xs 
^ 
/ba/ aÍd B as t / p^/ .
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"nd 
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i"":il #;;;"-i" iooo¿t'it' coincide withìhe boundaries of categorical
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,p""t"rr, i., *ft-t the diference btc-t"i /l/ and /t/ crlnbe.t semantically
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;.";C;";i;""gË rl'",. discriminarion function has the trough that is
chafacleristicofcategoricalperception.InJapanese,thediffe¡ence'between/l/
;ä;;;;", 
" 
dift'ã'"'tt" ih"t 
".,et 
disti"gui'h"' two phonemes (That is to
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the existence of a mapping {ìom sirnple feâtures of the stimuli to perceived
categodes is not the no¡m, the absence ofsuch a mapping cannot be evidence
ofspecialness. It does no¡ illuminâte the specia.lness ofspeech.
It is tenpring to think that one could c¡ea¡e the appea¡ance ofân invaflance
problem for tlny cãtegonz¿tton task if one starced with a suficiently low_level
description of the input. One can recognize a large number of faces viewed
at various angles and in various lights, and one can recognize then-r benearh a
wide range of hats, spectacles, false noses, and so on. The invariances which
one exploirs in face recognition are at such a high level of description that if
one were fying to work out hou/ it was done given a moment-bv_moment
mathematical descrþrion of the rerinal array. it might well appear i'mposible.
There is sureþ no simple pattem of retinal stimulation ¡hai alwavs and onlv
occu¡s when I see a face as being my b¡orhe¡'s. My abiliry ro ,.ágrrir" hiá
is not a nrafier of my being triggered by some sirnple property of the array
he projects to my retina. A well-rrained boy scout c"o re.ogniz" gr"rroy
knots, reef knots, ¿nd sheet bends by touch alone, but the feaìures that he
uses when making these dìscriminations would be extremely ha¡d to recover
fiom a moment-by-moment presentation of the pressure that each kno¡ exerts
on his fingertips. There is certainly no profile of finger_tip pressures that is
always or only associated with granny knots, and so ¡he same sã¡¡ ofinvanance
shown by the âcoustic signal for speech is shown by rhe haptic signal for
kno¡s. Bur ir would be absurd to d¡aw any conclusions abour the specialness
ofboy scout knor-perceþtion on the basis of this invariance. It is siLply rhar
lhe boy scoul does no! categorize on the basis of simple fearures rhat can be
discerned in the moment-by-moment descnprion of finge¡rip pressures. The
speech spect¡ographs for which we find invariance in the speech signal are
moment-by-moment descriptions of the low_level properties presented to rhe
ear. It is no surprise thar rhey fail to show any featu¡es thac correspond with
the phonemes we hear in speech, and it is no indication ofspecialness.
Duplex Perteption
Duplex perception is a strange phenomenon and it occu¡s in a st¡ange context,
making it ¡ather ha¡d to interyret, bu¡ in rhei¡ article ,A Specialìzation for
Speech Perception', Liberman and Mattingly (r989) resr their ù¡hole case fo¡
the existence ofcognirive resources thar are devoted solely to speech processmg
on the phenomenon of duplex perception. Duplex perceprion occu., wh"r,
headphones are used to play a difi-erent sound to each 
"".. 
Mor. specifically,
it occu¡s when the sound given ro rhe first ear is a speech sound: a syllable
Iike /da/ or /ga/, but a speech sound that has been docrored so thar the initial
burst ofacoustic energy is absent. The ¡esult of ¡his doctoring is that the sound,
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if heard in isolation, is ambiguous between /dal and / ga/ ' The sound whicll
is presented to the other ear is just lhât bu$t of acouslic energy needed to
disan.rbiguate lhe doclored sound-lhe burst of rising frequency sound lhat'
if addeJ to the fìßt sound, would make it sound like a /ga/' ot the bursr of
falling frequency sound rhat would make it sound like a /da'l This second
,oonã, if h""rd in isolatior.r, sounds like a little chirp lt does nol sound like
speech. Here is Libennan and Mattingly's (1989) account of what it's like to
hear chis combinarion. (I've replaced theirjargon with r.nine):
Listeûeß hear two sounds, one at each ea¡ A¡ the eâr receiving the lsecond soundl'
they hear a non-speech chirp, just as rhey do when the þecond sound] is presenred in
irolatiorr. Ac the e". .eceiving the [fìnt sound] they hear /dal or /gal But' surprisingly'
these laller percepts are not tmbigLlous, as lhey were when the [fìrsr sound] rs presenred
rn isolationi rather, they are unambiguously delennined to be /dal or /gal by the [fact
about whether the second sound is a chirp of rising Íiequency or lilling frecluencyl'
just as when the undivided syllable is Presetæd in lhe nomlâi way (Liberman and
Matlingly 1989:49o)
Perhaps this resull is, as Liberman and Maltingly say, a surprising one' but is
it e.,iáence of specialness? One would not exPecl this mingling of lbe sounds
presented at either ear if simple non-speech sounds we¡e presenled' but' as
we emphasized above, simple sounds are not lhe relevant control group To
see if the duplex effect shows speech to be sPecial, we should compare speech
sounds to ,tãlt-sp"".h sountls of compatable complexity When Fowler and
Rosenblum (rqqo) did this, colr.rparing rhe duplex perception ofsyllables wirh
the duplex perception of wooden and metal door slams, the speech sounds
behave in rrrore or less the same way as lhe non-sPeech sounds Duplex
percePtion seems nol to indicate sPecialness
The MtCurk Efect
The slory so far is this We are trying lo unclerstand how it is that speech
perceplion diffeß ftorn normal perceplion in such a way rhat speech sounds can
te resolved much faster than other sounds We have looked at lhree Phenomena
tha¡ a¡e said to iÌluminate this specialness. Two of these phenomena (the lack
of invariance and duplex perception) we found to tell us nolhing âbour lhe
specialness of speech per se. They did nolhing more than Point tow¡r<ls some
ways in which the perception ofcomPlex, composite sounds can be expected
to dift-er f¡om the perception of simple sounds The othe¡ phenomenon we
have looked at is the categorical perception of sPeech We found there to
be good evidence that this phenomenon is relâted to the sPecialness that
we are trying lo understand, but we also saw some good reasons to doubl
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that this relationship is an especially intin.nte one. We curn now to thefou¡¡h of the phenomena that has been thought to cast light on speech,s
specialness. This is ¡he phenonenon known as the McGu¡k efi-ect. In the
McGurk effec¡, rhe syllable thar a speaker is hea¡d to have said is found
to be influenced by lip movements that the speake¡ is s¿e¿ to produce, as
well as by the acoustic infon¡ration glven ro the heare¡,s ear (McGurk and
MacDonald t97ó). The effecr occuls in the following way: A video is taken
of a speaker repeating the sfl)able /ga/ and an auditory recording is n.ude of
the speaker repearing rhe syllable /ba/ . When the auditory recorãng rs heard
alone, listene¡s âccurately recognize the syllable heard as a /ba/. li they are
hearing rhese sy))ables whiLe watching the vídeo of apyropríateþ timed /ga/s beíng
mouthed, then ¡he listener is subject to an illusion in which the souid. heard js
reported as being /dal.
The illusory syllable splits rhe difference berween the syllable heard and the
syllable seen. /ba/ , whtch gets presented to the ears, dift-ers f¡om / ga/ , whtch
gets presented to the eyes, in irs place ofa¡tìculacion. /b/s are bilabial (which is
to say that rhey are articulated ât the lip$, whìle /g/s are velar (which is ro say
thar they are articulated towards the back ofthe throaÐ. lØhat listene$ hear in
the McGu¡k effect js a /d/, which is an alveolar consonanr, made towards rhe
middle.
The efect may be thought ofas a somewhat surprising instance ofthe context
efecß that we discussed unde¡ rhe heading of ,The lnvariance Froblem,. The
facts about r.vhich phonemei a bu¡st of sound is hea¡d ¡o contâin are, as we
saw, influenced by a great many features of L.rre contcxt of the sound. What
the McGurk eft-ect shows is that context effects are not limited to efects
of a sound's øudítory context. The efi-ect is an efec¡ of ¡;¡søøl context on
heard sound. We we¡e unmoved by the invariance problem because context
effects are the norm for rhe perception of complex stimuli. The McGurk
effect is more impressive because cross-modal context effects are less obviouslv
nor-rnal.
But c¡oss-modal context effects are not entirely exception¿I. If the McGurk
effect shows that there is something special about speech, ic is not because the¡e
is anyrhing specìal about the facr thar speech is a srimulus that is subject to
influence f¡om concurrently presented visua.l stimuli. Lots of stimuli¡the¡ rhan
speech are subject to that sor¡ of influence. The influence is most frequently
discussed in connection with examples ftom ou¡side the audiuory domaìn,
such as ¡he illusion of selÊmotion produced by motion in rhe perþhery of
the visual field (Lee and Lishman r97j). Cross_modal efi-ec¡s a¡e ioolr¿ in th"
auditory domain, too. The McGu¡k case is not the only case in which vision
and auditory modalities combine in illusory ways, and so i¡ does not show
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that such illusory combinations are special to sPeech saldana- and Rosenblum
(1993) have shown rhat judgments of whether a cello sounds like it is being
iìí"k.J 
". 
ut*.a 
"re 
suújec; to Mccurk-like interference fiom visual stirnuli'
'Sound 
and vision can also inre¡act to produce tl5'41 illusions' notjust âuditory
ones. The number of flashes that a s;bjecl seerìs ro ree cân be influenced by
the number of conculaent tones that he frears (Lewald ând Guski 2oo3) 
4 It
tr^"", *"t"f to sPeech thar sound and vision can interact to produce hybrid
p"r."prion, influenced by both modalities, without the subjecr's being awâre
ofthe influence.
This is not to say lhal the McGurk eft'ect shows us nothing speciâl aboul
speech. The Mccu.k.f..t dot"tt'"^l an aspecl ofspeech that is in need ofa
,p".i"l 
"*pl"r.t"tion 
because lhe McGurk efect is of a much gteatet nøgtlítude
,'hrn 
"lt.tågo.t, cross-modal 
context efects for non-speech sounds Although
"""-rp.*it -t"¿t øre influenced 
by vision in much lhe same way that speech
soundóareinfluencedintheMcGu¡kefect,lheydonotseemtobeinfluenced
to rh" ,"-" extent The Parliculâr degtee of inflience from vision on whar
seems to the subject to be the auditory perception of speech does. seern lo be
anell.ectthar''..d,tob"explainedbythepostulationofsomethingspecial
âbout speech Processing.
ffrir'i, *ottt, emphæizing becau se a quuntítcttít)e diferer.rce between speech
perceptiolr ancl the ierception of olher sounds u.ray be erplained by reêrence
io 
^ 
)rortitotir" kinã of specialness on lhe parl of speech Given-that sounds
i.r gåerat are so lewhat susceptible to McGu¡k-like effects' we do nol need
io'porr.tt",. very much ,p".iul'.t"ss lo explain why speech isdistinguhhed
f.oà orh.r sounds by rhe degree of irs suscepribiLiry to such efi-ecrs Perhaps
the unusua\ high susceptibility of speech sounds to the McGutk effecr is
explained Uy tl" a"t drat the contexts in which speech sounds ate heard
"rË, ,o " gr"",a, 
exlenl than are lhe conrexls of other sounds' occasìons
*h.r. th.-ro.tr." of the souncl is visible and whe¡e the visual inforrnation
i, 
" 
pot"lrti"l source of useful disambiguating information The existence of
othe, 
"uditory-vi 
oal c¡oss-modal illusions shows th¡t there are n-recl-ranisms
i" p1".. Uv 
-hi.h -riro^l stinuli can influence the Perception of sound The
i".i ,tt"r rp"."f, sounds ate unlike othe¡ sounds in lhe degree to which
rt is useþl to make fine discriminations, and the facr lhal speech sour.rds
"r".r.tlik" othe¡ sounds 
in the frequency with whicl.r visual i¡formation
f¡onr lhe sound sot¡rce is available for helping with such discrilninations'
.oold tog.ttt", explain why lhe mechanisms of c¡oss-modal influence (not
.AvividdeÌnonstralion'describedinKrnntaniatldshinojo(2ool),canbefoundat:<htç://wrnv
cns.ar¡ jpl-klrtn/¡udiovisu3lRâbbrt/index htrÙÌ>
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.tr;::ä 
rhemselves) come to be especiaÌly influential on rhe perceprion
The magnitude of rhe McGu¡k e.ffect does reveal something special aboutthepsychology of speech perception,. br, ,h. ,;;;"';rr'"i.åi,,,"* a, ,n.McGu¡k efect might just be thar the 
"."""i ;;.;;; li "r¿io,r¡.r"lint::1c:-ion are especially ac¡ive fo¡ speech on ,".o"rrr-oîìlrî 
""""rr_"r,availability of occasions on which rhey ir" *_. ,"," nli, Jroii'. 
"""",r_"oudliry of their doing so. our final verdic¡ 
"" 
,h;;*jt"";;;'1, 
,o. ro,o,Theory of speech perception is rhis: the û", .¡rp;'.;;;;;.,ä,io' o""ato be, erplained, bur the phenomena that have Uå" afr."rr"j 
", 
i they wererevealing of the ways in which speech ì, ,p."i"l rrro out to ,.[ lrl"ro.. rru..The McCu¡k eû'ecc does show ,.,-..t;i" .^-;; ";:: :" 
* 
" i 'bwrairstomakÇil;;il"r.îfi::,:i:i:inîï:ï:*,ïî.îi:::;
needs. I¡ fails to tell us whether
tt difi-ers f¡om normal audirorv :-thj e:ttlttl of speech is special becausedtnè;;";;;';;îii:"J, ji:"ï:.å'å:.,i.::;'"rJ"üffi :#jlî::
f,uploseg ¡o 
suppon. and thar purports ro give an explanarion of ¡hem, and ofrhe specialness with which we began.
Any interpretarion of a sìien¡ific rheory is probably irristaken if the theoryis interpreted as sayrng something riwial, or 
__.,frUg 
""ry'"Urrio,rr. ft tequally likely to be nristaken if the theory i, irrt.rp."r"d'", -r"l¡"* '__.,nr"*
obviously false. The most ciiscussed ,lr-i.rry..."n:, ,p.oüJ" ,i il. ,r,".Theory of Speech perception. The task of salng 
_rri, ,frî'"ï",""ts 
"a,lr*rheory are prove\ ro be much her¿er 
"," 
l--"*,^T_ 
-l: :""':l
because rhe rheory has rro, o".rrt"ll-ll 
than one. might expect Thrs is not
the theory ,..*, io- ;";; 
grven a canonical statement' but because
;;;";';'J", j:"i:i;.i'i:;j:l;iJ",**i1ä,îi:TtrJJ,"i
The canonical statement of the theory was given in r9g5 when Libe¡manand Matringry wrore 'The Mo¡o¡ Theoty 
"rsp"ã.rrn**iåï¿ïrr.o,. ,n"1'tell us thâr'The first claim of rhe Moror Theo.y, * .."ir:;,;;;;,i" 
.r¡""nofspeech perception are the intended phonemic gestures of rhe speaker,. ,Firstand firnd.rmenralJy'. we are rotd. .,¡"à ¡ ,¡. aj,o',ir, onii.J. i'r..n,,""rs perception of gesture, (Liberman ¿nd M¿rtingly ,9sj, ;;1.'H;;;" 
_. .unde$tand this claim? There a¡e ar least two possibilities, suggested by a farniliar
THE MOTOR THEORY OT SPEECH IERCE?TION 223
distinction from discussions ofperceptual epistemology ln those discussions,
we often encounter the distinction behveen two diferenl Perceptual relations
distinguished in natural language by the dife¡ence belween perceiving an entiry
and perceiving úhøf something or othe¡ is the case. There are, corresponding
to these two perceptual relations, at least tlvo ways in which Liben¡an and
Mattingly's claim about rhe object of speech percePtion could be interyreted'
It could be a claim about the sort of lhing that goes in the 1 place in true
sentences ofthe forrl 'He heard y' (when the hearing in queslion is an inslânce
of speech hearing). Or, altemarively, it couìd be a claim about the sort of
rhing thac goes in place of the P in lrue senlences of the forrrr 'He heard that
P' (when the hearing in question is an instance of speech hearing) When
Liberman and Mâttingly talk of perceiving 'gestures', what they mean is that
when we hear a /b/ lhe object of our perception is a bilabial plosive gesrure;
that when we hear a /n/ we ìheer an alveolar nasal gesture; and so on What
isn't clear is which of the rwo perceptual reladons these geslures are sLrPposed
to be the objects of
On a fìrst reading, Liberrrran and Mattingly are claiming rhat when e lisrener
hears speech, it is true lhât he hea¡s intended phonemic gestures lf this is
the couect reading of rheir clairn, then thei¡ claim is surely true Sentences
of the form '¡ hea¡d s' are true if and only if there is something identicâl to
s that x heard. This context for 's' is an extensional one So, for example,
it is true rhat Miss Sca¡lett heard the gunshot jusl if it is true thal there is
something that Miss Scarlett heard, and true chât that lhing was the gtrnshot lt
doesn't matler whether she recognized it as a gunshot, or even if she has any
concept ofgunshots. IfMiss Scarlett thought that she wâs hearing a champagne
bottle beir.rg opened, but lhe sound was in fact thât of a gun firing, then it is
nonetheless rrue that Miss Sca¡lett heard the gunshot She heard it; she was
just mistaken about what s]rre heatd. Understood in this way-as a claim about
ìhe object of ¡he x }reard y relation-the 'fì¡st claim of the Motor Theory' is
uncontrovenial. A speech act ls a sequence ofinlended phonenic gestures, so
the truth of sentences of the form 'He heard inrended phonemic gestures' is
guaranteed. by the existence of truths of the form 'He hea¡d the speech act'
Þerhaps, tike Miss Sca¡letr, we do not k¡ow what il is thal we are hearing-
The claim lhat rve hear phonemic gestures is conPatible with ¡he claim thar
we hear such gestures unbeknownst to us-
This claim is true, and obviously so, but it won't do as an interpretation of
what Liberman and Matringly intend, because it can'r do the work that the
Motor Theory is supposed to do To claim that lhe Perception ofspeech is the
perception ofgesture in lhis sense is not to idenrifi a feature lhat r.nakes speech
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:ï:tj;^|t,:" if speech perception were exactþ the same as normat audition,rnen me obJect ol perceprion in this sense would srill be the gesture. If.we wan!the Motor.Theory to be making a non-obvious craim, we should understandit to be making a claim abour the othe¡ of the two ,orr, oÇlJptt 
..t",iorr,Ic must make a claim about the objecr of the rela¡ion ,, ¡.ui'rno, O, . l¡orcis required for rhe trurh of sentences with the fonn ,ø hea¡d thot pl, , ,h^o *^,required for the t¡uth of .¡ hearcl s, because this context is 
"n 
in¡.nsion"l or_re.Although Mìss Scarletr can ,.uly say, on learning about the circumstances ofthe dea¡h. 
_'I 
heard the gunshoÉ, she .rnoot t_,rlir"y ,i", ,l"i""iJ ,frr, ,fr.."
was a gunshot. Nor ifshe took il for rhe opening ofa bo,ú". H"".irre ¡¡o¡ ,t 
"r"w'rs a gunshor requires (rnrong orher rhingg rh¿r rhe event be h-eir¿ as ¡"¡r"
a gunshot lf-rhe Moror Theory cla;ms that inrended Oh";;;;;;;;';;:rr¡e oo¡ects ot speech perception jn the sense rhat speech percepriãn rnvoluesperceiying f/ral there were ce¡rain intended phonemic g.rr,.,."r, d"r, ilr. ,Ìr.oryis conrmirted ro our hearing speech øs iriog 
^ ""r"of in ""i"i'pfr.""_"gestu¡es.
. 
The claim that we hear speech as being phonemic gestu¡es is ¡arher counre¡_intuitive, and it is easy to produce an argument showing it to be false. Supposewe have a listener, who, being in rhe grip of rorn" Tl."-ri.oîìbo,,, ,h.phonemic gestures, believes that /b,/ i, oo", 
" 
b;t.,bi"l pl*;"", ¡-"*'O*rl*"fartrill. Such a listener is easy uo imagine. It is equally 
""ry r"'irrrlgìri""rlr"r r".l,a lis¡ene¡ is listening to a speech replete 
-ith lrrr,"rr""r'of /i7, ?"ã ,n", rr. araking the experience at face value. He need not believe he is subjecr to anyso¡t of illusion. If hearing the /b/s in the speech i,luolu.a t 
""l-ij rl"* o,bilabial plosives, rhen this rhinker would be juilry ofso me son ofìTrationatíty,just as one who believed rhar no gun n"J U"er, fi¡ed would be gurlty ofirracionaliry if he persis¡ed in his belief of ha'ing experiencJ;;;; ,.or"rr."of events as being gunshors. A âlse rheory 
"blo,:iphorretics i, "","r. -"Arfyrefuted: speech perception doesn,t present us wich the underþing gestures asa_part of the content of expedence. We could make the ,"tlr. po-irriio ,rro..Wittgensteiniân rones: one who is searching for 
" 
t"bioaeotJAi.ìorr" ,rr"yneed a look-up chart to tell him when he Àas successfully ø""j-."". ,r""who is searching fo¡ a recl flower famously needs 
"" 
,".Í ùJ_ìp"'"¡"rr. rf
Phonemic gestu¡es were given in the contents ofexperience, then ,labiodentalfücarive' would behave like ,red, in this respect. Tie .."** 
"f "*0."""".have to be non-inferentially grzeø, and phonernic 
,"r,or", 
"."J, Ou.i ," ,fr",way. It is not the case that when x perceives ,pe"ch, , perceirres that ceftainphonemic gestures were made.
lt can seem thac the Motor Theory is stuck with an irresolvable dilemma.Either it is making a claim about rhe ¡ela¡ion ofheari"g, 
", 
Ji, 
-"iì.; 
" 
a"i_
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about the relation o fheartrg that.Ifit is making rhe first claim, then it is saying
something true, but something that cannot contribute to our undeßlanding
of the specialness of speech. If it is making the second claim, then it is saying
something demonstrably false This dilemma only arises because we tâke the
Motor Theory co be making a claim about rhe object of a perceptual relation
in which the subjett ís a petson. CeLn the theory avoid these problens if it ¡etreals
to making a clain about a søbpersoxal relacion? The fìrst ho¡n of the dilemma
remains-'r hea¡d s'is an extensional context for s, whalever we pLrt in
the x place, so the idendry of speech with phonemic gesturing guâIanlees
rivially that phonemic gestures are perceived when speech is' The move to a
subpersonal perceiving subject can't help here. Bul perhaps it helps with the
dilemrrrat other horn. The second horn of the dilemma does look like a place
in which the tactic of noving to a subpersonal perceiving relation seems more
promising. The problems at that hom were problems thal ârose because the
ih"ory ,."-"d wrongly ro convict a certain kind of thinker of ilrationaliry'
These are problems thal rhe move to rhe subpersonal may help wirh, since the
notions of¡ationaliry and irrationality are notions that lose their grip when we
move to lhe subPersonal.
To avoid the problems sel out above, the Motor Theory needs ro be
interpreted as making a claim about a subpersonal perceiving relation, and ir
needs this perceiving relalion not to be an exlensional one, or else the ptoblems
associated with the fìnt hom ofthe above dilenrma will arise again How should
we undersrand this noúon of a subpenonal, non-extensional 'perceiving that'
¡elation? When we were at the pe$onal level, we had some intuitive grasp of
the way in which the personal 'perceiving rhat' relation fails to be exlensional'
but at the subpersonal level, much mo¡e wo¡k is needed ifwe a¡e to u¡rlersrand
the source of the non-extensionaliry of the 'perceiving that' ¡elation '\c the
personal level, hearing rlror there was a gunshot requires hearing lhe soúnd as a
lunshot. If we are lo make sense of ¡he Motor Theory as clâiming that speech
is represented as phonetic gestures âl the subpersonal level, then we shall need
" 
,tbp".roo"l notion of representing ds, corresPonding to the personal-level
notion of hearing dr. Il is â natural thought that lhe way to undentand this
notion is through some kind of connection with particular concepts B:ot, for
reasons akin to lhose we've already seen, a conceptually dernanding notion
won't serve the motor theorisl's puÌposes. One who lacks the concePls of
phonemic geslures cân nonerheless hea¡ what's being said to hin, and even if
ihe think". has those concepts, they do not seem to be engaged jusr because
speech is being Perceived.
The situation we are in is this: The Motor Theory makes the claim that
gestures are the objects of speech PercePtion We are trying to understand
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what this could mean. We havc,a,¡ntha,c;;.;;;.;;:ïïi:iïiä;:;ï:,ï3""."ï.,:iïnîi,,::
::,:,,':i : l i!' :,{;,i3i',"1"î:o' " t'"r "ì on. o, ., i,i }' å,,iT 
", 
p e,c ep r u ¿ r
"r.h or,h"r";;ä¡*ì,':#iî 
be m¿de that a perceprual relarion that ¿voicls
A subpenonal represenrarion 
.l:t'-'oo-.'ot 
notion of carrying info¡ma¡ion.
,tiog *rrt'o",;;,;îä;':"011,*t inJ mation about soÍne properties of a
c.rrr¡,rng informarion ,oou, ,ort'n* 
conceprs ofrhar thing. and rhis norion of
th. 
"ooî.,rt, ;;*'*;;:;i"e 
aspec¡ of a rhing aììows us ¡o individuate
j:-:::0" ",," á;J;;;;;;i::."j"""T,jïij"fi:.H:ï:J:i:täarepresenhrion of speech is the
appearance is nL;sieìdìng.,"; ìriiffi;l'î ;l;ilï,::.:ä ïJ:JT;becarrse phonemes ¿re inrtíuiduated úy the tip ;.;;;J,;.i iiJo"* ,n",,.A glance ar the intem¿rion¿l oh
.r.ì,in.a uy ;il ;i;;ä",ï"**,.:,li:ff ,;;i;ïï',:iï"1,1ï:iî,îî
by rhe sor of movemenr made þrosives, *r"r, inür,'"0r, äiîiìr"r, 
"r,o 
roon. are ways oImoving rhe mourh.parrs). wh", i,; ail iàro ì. _r,r,'
:^l::" .""r,":"1: is for its pronunciarioo ¡o ir,r,olu. _Jr* 
-1"".."""u 
"a";ijïïi: i:.l;i#:1î,î'"""'" "u"'iir'"""ä., *,',"n.i, ."r,o*
have,o be .";":'lä;,,'i:Ë:iiïfïtrï:,*l';lf:X :*lrepresenradon that carries informarior, 
"t our tlr" *orä;;;";;";å.ro ,?_latto.ctrne" inform¡rion ¿bour rhe lip movernents 
'',r;"."'"'" 
,"."".
The thing thar is dis¡inctive abr
and orhe¡ Moror Theorists 
" 
,r'"' 
,n" approach of Liberman and Mamingly
phoo.-i. g.,tuå, ;, ;;;;ï. i.ï11 jl:.]: ""j'"" o|represenring speech as
Í-.:, 
u.:. n 
:,,o,r,",r,i nr.i, .ìpJ.l ;1ï,;1.:;ilii,#n[:;i::l,ti¡nstead to the thinker.s caÞacip r
, h i, n 
",,r ;. 
ì,' ;;; ;.ìj,.ïilä':,í::l'[J if :iï: i; j:,. î",0*.n
ii," 
"'î,Jiff îi' ;î iH,3','. :i' i,'h"' -; ;.i; ;", ;i: :,Ï''ir-::L r," p*,',r";.ï;;; ;"..1 ï'åïåîilXîï11'ï"î::*:*::*
surely possibìe ¡o he¿r sÞeech so¡¡nds that one cannor produce oneselh Thechild born with an ill_fo¡med mou¡h does ,rot, of.our"", face deafness- Noris the poor mimic unable ¡o hear
that ir is beyond him to imitate. a,il: 
tPt"th.lf,'hose wilh regional accents
r,, +",.,o.,, o? .;ffi ;,il;. ;ii:: J : : #iï?l iïil,l:ï ;:ï:1rhe Moror I heory the findine bv M¿cNeil.*". ooo,.r. ìnl'aiì.. i,à.¿ ,nr,'peopJe who hrve been oarhoto;.,¡1y ¡¡ç¿p*,. u._i,"n ii.ii.li,i* ,n.,.a¡riculaton rre nonerh"l.ss rble ro perceive speech. 1f ibermin-riaî.,,r1ngty
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r98j: 24). On account of rhese findings, they moved from a claim aboul the
vocâl Íact itselJ to a claim about an internal model of the vocal t¡act The
theory as revised does not claim that we actualìy use our mouths and thro¡ls
in hearing speech, but thal the perceplion of speech involves lhe use of 'an
internal, innately specifìed vocal-tract synthesizer' (Liberman and Mattingly
r98j: zó).
This move f¡om a claim about the vocal tract to a claim about an internal
model of the vocal tract brings with it a loss of clarity because it is not
imrnediately obvious whar it faÈ¿s for a bit of r.reurâl apparatus to constitute an
internal model ofthe vocal tracl. Several suggeslions could be made to help us
undersrand the claim. One such suggestion would starl with the observ¡tion
that there are some contexts in which one sysleDl can be said to n-rodel
another just if the model can be used lo generare reliable predictions about
the system modeled. This is the sense of 'model'in use wl.ren a load-bearing
spring is said lo model an inte¡-molecular force, the effects of LSD are said
to model schizophrenia, and, perhaps, some computer progralr-rs are said to
model rhe wearher. If che Motor Theo¡isl's claim that the apparatus ofspeech
perception includes a model of rhe vocal tract is undersrood as a claim that
involves this sense of modeling-as-prediction-gene¡ation, rhen problenrs arise
alongjust the Lines that we have already seen. There is a problem with saying
that some parl of our brâin generates reliable predictions about vocâl ttâcl
gestures if these predictions are personal-level stales-normal perceivers of
speech make no such predictions Ar.rd there is a problem if rhe 'predictions' in
question are subpersonal representations encoding information about the vocal
t¡act-any subpenonal state that encodes information about phonemes also
encodes infomration about vocalic gestures, on account of phonemes being
individuated by the vocalic gestLr¡es that Produce lhem.
There is, however, anolher sense of 'rnodel' on which the Motor Theorist's
cl¿in.rs stand more chance of being both plausible and explanatory' We can
say thal one syslem models another if the fìrst behaves in a way analogous
to the behavio¡ of the second, and if it does so Jot analogous r¿aso¡'rs 5 lf one
system is a model of another in this sense then it can be said co represent that
system, and the parlicular states in the model that occupy the same functional
role as a parlicular part of rhe system modeled can be said to represent those
particular parts. This may grve us â sense of'represent' lhat we can use to
undersrand the Moto¡ Theorist's clain-r that we represent speech as phonemic
gesture.
5 This is rea1ly just a dynmic veßion of the comtnoD or gatdeD concept of ¡ model as we find rt
applied to model trains, and rhc lìke. It is nothng to do wlth the technicâI, logioanl sens-
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lf one system can be said ¡o model another in this sense (as opposeclto rhe less clemanding and already rejecred sense 
"l_;;;;;_"r_p*or.r-"_generadng), then there must be a high degree of ,yrrr_"ri,-þ.*".o 
,fr.causal archirecru¡e of the model¿nd-th., or,ñ" ,rr,",', Io-.oì*å. irrn. rrrr._modeled inctudes r,ovo srares. bo¡h of which ,,iú"r" i;;;;;; rìn4e fe"tu.eof the system modeled, then rhe corresponding 
""Lr'"îrià ï"0" ,,-'"r,also share rheir origins. Similarly, if two srâres ãa ür.-rr**'-"Oeled havedfferent exptanarions, the¡e shouid be 
." 
difi."re,rc" ;; ;;;; ;. anatogousstates arise in the model. Moreo
requires that a s,2sr",,",. 
-",;¿:ï;.*,:",î"tHff Í"ïî::ti:'i:*:;âfâirs, that s'"re must be a genuínely unfied sr^te.,¡,¡"-r*lîiä", 
,"0 ,lr.flooding in wales a.e both .a,,."d úy rh"e 
"r"" "f t;;;;;;;^.ä', 
"o- 
,n.north, then my mereorologicat model is nor g".d ;;; ;;;î.0..r..,,r.,*Brisrol as rainy is a result ofhavìng access to information about rainfall, and irsrepresenting Wales as flooded is a result ofhaving acc.r, ,o ,o-" oìr,. ,"p"."r.body of intormaLion abour river flow. rhe .;"ï;;;;;il;tlqui..n,.n,
ca'''r be mer by gerymandering a disjunctive ,"r. 
"";;;:;;';; bodies ofrnformation.6
Fo¡ the brain to contain a model of rhe vocal tracr (and so, in this sense, forit to be able ro represent speech as phonetic gesrurerl, ìr.. rrrr.- iiLr.¡ ,¡"brain gets from the souncls at the eâr ro tf,. ."i..r"r.rr*io', o1*l.or rro"t.",rrrr,inclu.ie a part in which the processing of ,.;..r.;rJo;; 
.iffiir._.*r"with the trearment received bv .o.,,rã, 
". 
,h"y p"r, À"ï 
"ïä1i"." . ,,nr,and 
^oul 
Could the b¡ain,s p-""rrirrg of speech proceed in a way that wor.rldsatis$' chis non-gerÐ¡manderea 
."r,ot ,r-rro.pt,irrr' ;.ilåii; i. ,¡rr, i"virtue of modeling rhe vocal rract, rt. U.rrr, .á,_rta .ig;öï"-r*'r"'*Or"r".r,
vocal t¡act gesrures? I think not, bu¡ I do think ,l_r"i *J i""" i"å, 
"_""aar the co'ecr *ay ro undershncr rhe con¡enr 
"f ,h.;;;;ï;;;ir sp"..tl:ï.or-" The Motor Theory shoutd be ""d",;;J;;'"ì;"li ior", ,n"exrslence in the b¡ain ofa causellv j5e¡¡orphic model 
"f,fr. u".rì,'r"",. f, _"ybe that there is such a model, bit, fo. 
" 
couple ofreasons that we shall nowturn to, it does not seem to be at all likely thaì there is.There are rwo ways fo¡ the b¡ain,s processing ofspeech ¡o model the vocaltract, and each is problematic. The model .o,_rld *ork U".t*"r¿r_ì"U"g ,,input rhe acousric profiles which th" ,ro.rl 
..a.rc ;i;;;;;"iì; or, .",iio -lftî* them to find rhe phoneric i",."ri.", ,r,",-r"ïìi."ì,i"" ,.".,gorng. This is the most obvious way for such a mo¿a a _.rt,îr, ,i" *"¿a
" Spellrg our lvhcn c\d.Jv , rr.,re rs scnuinety un,fird rnd whcn gerÌynandired ,j, of { uu^e, nor¡ne¡\ymJrrrr.forourpu¡poscsrheiDrurtivcnorionwiUh¡ve,o,rm.",-- --.-,,*.
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could, alternatively , work Jorwatds. The model could try out a whole range
ofvarjous inputs. and use these to geneüre representarions of various acouscic
profiles which it then conpares lo the acoustic profile that has been encoded
Ly the ear. When it frnds a rnatch belween one of the generâted âcouslic
profiles and the profìle perceived, it can identifi the input lhat produced the
march. These lwo akernative ways of using a model correspond ro the two
strategies rhat, in the psychological litemture, are given the unlovely names
'"lr"fii, by analysis' and'analysis by syr.tthesis' Alr analogy will help to clarify
the áifference between the two approaches. Suppose chat Mr Jones is playing
noles, one at â time, on the piano, and that Mr Smich has the job offinding
out which notes Mr Jones is playing To help him in his task, Smith is seated in
the same room as Jones, and at the keyboard ofan exactly similar piano There
are two tactics Smith can use The speediest tactic would be to Lift che lid of
his piano, press lhe sustain pedal so that the strings are not damPened' and
watch co see which stdng resonates This r¡'jlt be the string lhat coüesponds to
the note Jones is playing. The second laclic is for Smith to press each of the
notes on his keyboard, or.re after the other, and listen to hea¡ when the noce
he plays sounds lhe same as the nole Jones plays ln each case, Srnitb uses his
piano as a rnodel ofJones's The fìrst tac¡ic is analogous to analysis by analysis'
Th" r".o.rd racdc is analogous to analysis by synthesis The method of analysis
by analysis is the mo¡e efiìcient ofthe two'
To åeet the causal isomorphism requiremenl, a speech processor which
could successfully detect the /d/ at the beginning of 'di' and the / d/ at the
begrnning of'du; would have to do so by the same means, for both '/d/s result
frÃ th" ,"-. patteln of gestures. But, as we saw in our discussion of the
lack of invariance, the dift-erence in the following vowel causes this pactern
of gestures to Produce diferent effects on the features of rhe acoustic proftle'
Th-e degree to which there is a lack-of-invariance problem, as discussed above'
,ho-, lr"t lhere can be no model of the voc¿l tract that satisfìes rhe causal
isomorphism requirement and conducß successfi¡l analysis by analysis The
causal isor.norphism requirement calls for a single part ofthe model detecting all
and only, for example, longue-backing, while the lack-of-invariance problem
tells us that there is no featu¡e of the acoustic Profile such lhat a device thar
operated as a detector of that feature would be responding to all and only
tongue-backing.
Perhaps because lhey are aware of the tension between their claims about
lack of invariance and the possibiliry of analysis by analysis, the advocates of
the Motor Theory have rypically accepted the prima-facie less plausible aøøl1'sis
by synthesß account, ¿ccording to which the model of the vocal trac¡ in the
b,r'ain generates several representations of acousric profiles, and then comPares
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the profiìes it has generated to the acoustic profile heard, so that, on finding
a match, it is able to identify whatever inpur to the model of the vocal tract
produced a representation that coresponds to the profile presented. Even ifan
initial bìt ofanalysis by analysis is used to reduce the set ofprofiles that must be
generated ro a set ofplausible candidates, the task ofanalysis by synthesis seems
so vast that ir could only be successfully completed in a realistic ¡ime frame if
the candidate profiles are produced by massively parallel processing. There a¡e
a huge number ofpossible things thar you could be doing with your mouth at
any dme, and the analysis by synthesis approach requires that a model of the
vocal lract try each one ofthem out to see whether the acoustic consequences
it genentes match the sound hea¡d. ,\ single model ofrhe vocal cract tryiug out
each of these possibilities in series would have to be working at a colossal rate
for speech to be perceived in ¡eal ¡ime. Analysis by synthesis is only plausible
if parallel processing is employed, but parallel processoß fül ¡o meet the ,no
gerrymandering' clause in the causal isomorphism requirement on modeling.
To see that they must do so, suppose there are two models working in parallel,
one ofwhich tries out rhe lip movements corresponding ro ,du, and the other
ofwhich tries out the lip movements corresponding to ,da,. On one occasion
the sound presenred is a 'du' and rhe profile produced by the fi¡st model gets
matched ¡o the profile of the sound hearcl. On another occasion the sound
hea¡d is a'da'and rhe second model produces the match. In bo¡h cases a /d/
is recognized, and so to meet the causal isomorphism requirement there must
be a single stare fearuring in Ìhe recognirion of both sounds-but for there
to be such a state is fo¡ there r?¿l to be separate paths operating in parallel.
Ânalysis by synthesis is implausible unless the synthesizing models operare in
parallel, but models operacing in parallel fail to meet the causâl isomorphism
requirement, and the sþtes of models operating ìn parallel therefo¡e fail to
count as reptesenradons ofparts ofthe vocal t¡act.
We have ¡ried various ways to inre¡prer the claims of the Motor Theory
of Speech Perception, but found none of them to be both plausible and
neaningful as an account of how speech perception is done. We have also
found thar ¡he evidence that has been thought to ¡ecom¡nend the Motor
Theory's approach is wanting. This might lead us ro.give rhe whole thing
up. Nonetheless, I claimed above that I would end with a gesture in the
cli¡ection of a place where these problen.rs couid be solved. That place is,I think, closer to rhe spirit of the original Motor Theory than ir is ro the
more sophisticated theory that was developed in the light of the evidence
and argumenrs that have been reviewed here. We rejected rhe idea thar the
apparatus of speech perceprìon is the apparatus of speech production because
the perception of speech that one cannot produce is so obviously possible.
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'We saw chat this consideration led the Moto¡ 
Theorists to change their
clains to claims about inlernal uodels oî the vocal 
ffact They went f¡om
;;i;;;;.", there being just one svstem to a claim about 
two svstems'
one of which wâs a model of th" othe' This seems 
to me- to have been a
source of unnecessaÐ¡ difüculties There was no 
need for the original one-
ä;;;;Ñ;; to be abandoned so entirelv The Mocor Theoris¡ can
.--r"¡- *'ttl claim rhat ch"te lt 
" 
single comn1on mechanisnl of speech
Pcrlcru) '"'" -^---- , that t.Jis rrre.h"ni m represents phonernicproducrion and p¡r1ep.on, a1;. 
,;;;,;il;"tic idea rh¡r rhe c¿pecirygelrures witholrt b"t:* tt*tÏ;;;, 
,¡i .ror.lny ro perceive it A single
ro produce 
'peech alu 
rvs *"-li;;;;:.;,åï ìi.o 
"'",, 
n"* rhe runcrion
common mechanrrn of Productrol
of directing speech productron ""J p"""ptù" 
when orher thins11e elual;
î ;"ïïr.tJ il case that *i"ni'u 'i.' svsten is able 
to perceive it is
î""ì" i-ut." ih"t" "'" plt''f of ways in 
which the per{ormance of
a conrbined production/comprJt'-"iolt 'y"tltt could 
be impaired on the
il;.;;;1å.":*T*,Y'ii"Ii::ff :î':;,':å,:ïï:lir'ffi:"i:
resource' ofspeech productlon' rnJt rnesc 't-""." ,'f'': ^-^" ,-
,.,i",",, ""a',r'", trrae '"me -r;;.5::il,il:Ï:: Ï.itiiil"iilit,l";OverlaPs in Ptocessing resource
;;;;ä Jira"l,ã""_,¡" lexicon, presumably, ser.ves both, as 
do sorne
,îr'oJ".r- o, *'"tt"talicâl ânalysis W" ti'.t ttnde"r"nu 'n: Y,"-::: 
Theory as
proposing that the overlaps in represenurional resources 
continue-out to lhe
less abstract levels of ,"pr.r"rlr",iår., n.eded ro get 
rhe n.roulh_ ro move in the
righr way. and needecl to *tt u' ì"ro a position ìo know, 
whjch 
-word5 
are s¿id
fir. ;il, t' a tketch for the 'o'r ol p'opo'"] thac 
mighr be nr¡de lf ic is to
be developed, rhen we shalÌ neeJto bå " lot 
clta'et ¡bout the rtuth conditions
ofthevarious,o,t,of,.p.","',t"tionpostulatingclainrsthatcanbemadein
subpersonal cognitive psychology'
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